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Abstract
This paper aims to compile past research on the sovereign debt crisis as well as the
formation and role of monetary unions, specifically optimal currency areas. It further analyzes
the causes as well as possible future consequences for Greece and the European Monetary Union
(EMU). It will provide a history of how Greece reached the debt levels it did and the measures
taken by the EMU over the past decade. There are multiple responsible parties for the conditions
that have prevailed in Greece. These parties include the investors in Greek assets, the EMU, and
the rating agencies as well as the Greek government and Greek citizens.
Investors have a responsibility to inform themselves of the economic and financial
conditions of their investments; however, without the due diligence of the ratings agencies and
with the corruption prevalent in the Greek economy, their job became exceedingly difficult. The
European Monetary Union failed to monitor excessive deficit levels of member countries, but
Greece also falsified its financials to allow for its admittance into the monetary union. The thesis
further draws the connection between corruption, interest rates, and Greece’s debt accumulation.
The excessive build-up of debt (that resulted in the sovereign debt crisis and collapse of the
economy) was ultimately a result of the Greek government overspending to meet the standard of
living expectations of Greek citizens.
The primary consequences discussed are the results of Greece’s continued membership in
the monetary union versus a possible “grexit” (Greece leaving the union). The hypothetical
benefits and drawbacks to both options are evaluated. The thesis concludes with my
recommendation for a focus on fiscal and political unity to reduce the probability that such a
crisis will occur in the future. One of the fundamental reasons for the creation of the EMU was to
promote a positive relationship between admitted countries, but the crisis has strained those
5

relationships. The only way to rebuild the monetary union is to understand what happened in the
first place and implement future strategies to protect those relationships.
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Part I: Introduction
Όλα καλά (Ola Kala)! The translation of this phrase is “it is all fine” in Greek. Given the
recent economic crisis in Greece, this is now unlikely said about the country. There have been
numerous analyses on the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the factors that contributed to it. In
short, the crisis resulted from certain Eurozone member countries’ inability to repay their
accumulated government debt. The recession experienced by Greece as a consequence of its
excessive debt compares only to that of the United States during the Great Depression, as seen in
Figure 1. The literature to date on the Greek debt crisis focuses on the European Monetary Union
(EMU), the situation in Greece leading up to and including the crisis, and the corruption in the
Greek economy. Government corruption and tax evasion are two of the primary contributors
toward Greece’s unsustainable lifestyle and its resulting high debt levels. Much of the research
on the difficulties monetary unions face and the role corruption has on an economy was available
prior to the crisis and could have served as warning signs of the potential problems for both
Greece and the Eurozone as a whole.
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Figure 1. Greece’s GDP compared to other areas during the economic crises in terms of
their length and severity. GDP refers to Gross Domestic Product. Copyright 2015 by the
Economist.com

This thesis examines the negligence of the parties involved in fueling the Greek debt
crisis. The parties evaluated include the investors in Greek assets, the EMU, and the rating
agencies as well as the Greek government and Greek citizens. Investors continued to feed
Greece’s debt habits because of either the assumed underwriting of the debt by the EMU or the
overconfidence in Greece’s fiscal future. Many investors believed the EMU would assist any
struggling country and prevent an economic crisis from forming. The EMU failed at effectively
policing its member countries’ fiscal policy and adherence to the Maastricht Treaty. The lack of
proper regulation resulted in a fiscal wedge forming between countries with more conservative
policies, like Germany, and those countries with more liberal policies, like Greece. The
increasing fiscal diversity between the countries has only worsened their ability to compromise
8

and unify in times of economic hardship, as observed with the current situation in Greece. Nation
leaders and the EMU are not the only ones at fault for the severity of the crisis, the rating
agencies have also played a role. Rating agencies are supposed to indicate the financial health of
debtors; however, in the years leading to the crisis, they primarily focused on the political
opinions expressed on Greece’s economic condition, resulting in long overdue and drastic drops
in debt ratings that further intensified the crisis. Greece also failed to monitor and fix its
corruption and overspending, primarily due to the example set by the Greek government and the
lifestyle expected by the Greek citizens.
Finally, whether Greece will remain in the Eurozone or be forced to leave will greatly
affect the future of both the country and the European Monetary Union. Although Greece only
makes up a small portion of the monetary union, what happens in the next few years in Greece
could set a precedent for future policies and assistance given to other EMU countries
experiencing similar economic troubles. One example is Italy, which also has high sovereign
debt and the same corruption rating. The example set by the EMU in bailing out Greece, despite
its fiscal irresponsibility and the risk associated with it, may result in other countries in the EMU
taking similar risks and expecting the same protection. If this moral hazard problem were to
arise, what has been a small-scale issue would instead become a debt epidemic within the EMU.
The policy response by the EMU is crucial because many believe the euro may one day
rival the dollar as the principal reserve currency and serve a growing portion of the world’s
economic activity. In order to compete with the dollar as the primary reserve currency, however,
four conditions would have to be met: The European financial markets would have to be liquid
(with the euro able to be commonly and quickly exchanged), “deep” (large quantities of the euro
can be bought or sold without drastically altering the value of the currency), maintain a stable
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exchange rate, and the euro must be backed by a strong economy and a government that instills
international investor confidence in its stability (Conerly, 2013). The Eurozone meets the first
three criteria, but, with the events of the sovereign debt crisis, investor confidence has been hurt,
the most damage resulting from the Greek crisis. The present condition in the Eurozone may
make the United States dollar and the Chinese yuan more viable alternatives than the euro
(Maverick, 2015). This only further exemplifies the importance of correctly evaluating the
causes of Greece’s economic condition and how the EMU should respond presently and in the
future in order to become a strong rival to the dollar.
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Part II: Literature Review

1. The Formation of a Monetary Union and the Role it Plays
In June of 2012, Robert A. Mundell, referred to as the “godfather of the euro” for his
advocacy of the Eurozone, said “the euro is more than just the icing on the cake on the single
European market and the European Union (EU), it is the glue that keeps the core of Europe
together” (Corcoran, 2012). This view perceives the euro as crucial to the political integration of
Europe. In 1992, participating European countries signed the Maastricht Treaty to create what is
now known as the Eurozone. The Eurozone is a monetary union: a group of countries under the
same currency and monetary policy monitored by a single central bank. Although a monetary
union is relatively easy to define, it is difficult to successfully implement. Currently the 19
members of the European Union that are using the euro are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Denmark and the United Kingdom optedout of the treaty while others still wait to meet the criteria for admittance. These candidate
countries are evaluated every two years by the European Commission and the European Central
Bank on the following convergence criteria (“Who can join and when?”):


Price Stability: Consumer price inflation rate no greater than 1.5% points above the
rate of the three best performing member states



Sound Public Finances: Government deficit no more than 3% of GDP



Sustainable Public Finances: Government debt no more than 60% of GDP



Durability of Convergence: Long-term rates no more than 2% points above the rate of
the three best performing member states in terms of price stability
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Exchange Rate Stability: Participation in ERM 2 (Exchange Rate Mechanism) for at
least 2 years without severe tensions



Integration: Adoption of the euro



Independence of National Central Banks: monetary policy by ECB is independent

In 1997, five years after the treaty was put into place, the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) was signed by EU member states in order to monitor and enforce the debt and deficit
criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty. The pact included two sets of rules, preventative and
corrective. Prevention comes in the form of the Medium-Term Budgetary Objective (MTO),
which is a target that holds members to Maastricht treaty agreements. Corrective rules come
from the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which works to reduce excessive debt levels (levels
exceeding the terms outlined above). The preventative rules were set into motion in 1999 and
corrective rules in 2005, the second was especially prevalent with the Greek deficit uncovered
the year before (2004).
Countries joining the Eurozone have had many reasons to do so. A monetary union
avoids many transaction costs such as that of converting currencies, thereby improving
transparency and trade. A common currency also alleviates exchange rate risk. The elimination
of exchange rate volatility for member countries promotes increased confidence in the stability
of a country’s economy. Less risk results in a lower interest rate that sparks investment.
Investment is the lifeblood of a country, but investment depends on the confidence in the future
health of a country, including its currency.
In a speech given to Tel-Aviv University in December of 1997, Robert A. Mundell
contributed to the reasons to join a group of countries sharing a currency (currency area or
monetary union). Possibly one of the most important reasons for a monetary union is the word
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itself, “union”. Unity can act as a “catalyst for political alliance or integration,” which can help a
world plagued by terror and distrust (Mundell, 1997). These alliances could also aid smaller
countries in having their joint voices heard on an international scale. A country may additionally
decide to join a union to remove the temptation to use primarily activist monetary policy to affect
output, inflation, employment, and interest rates as well as to stabilize its exchange rate. A
monetary union also allows purchasing power parity to hold more strongly between member
countries. Purchasing power parity is an economic theory asserting that when two countries have
equal purchasing power of goods, the exchange rates are in equilibrium (in the case of a
monetary union, the only barrier to equilibrium price levels are any remaining transaction costs).
It is found that this parity holds relatively well between developed countries, but is weaker
between developing countries and those outside of a monetary union (Simonoff, 2015). These
were all reasons many countries, such as Greece, decided to join the European Monetary Union.
Although a monetary union creates many benefits for a country, inherent costs also exist
with membership. Upon admittance to the EMU, Greece was aware of these costs. The loss of
independent monetary policy is one of the central problems, especially when a number of
countries are at different points in their business cycles and could benefit from this option when
trying to ease economic difficulties. For example, asymmetric macroeconomic shocks to
aggregate supply or demand, affecting only a subset of the monetary union, make stabilization
policy difficult without the option of devaluing currencies. Easy money for that subset is no
longer an option due to inaccessibility of monetary policy and countries experiencing negative
shocks must endure internal devaluation (“classical medicine”). One form of internal devaluation
would be reducing public sector wages, like Greece has done throughout the debt crisis.
Problems with internal devaluation are the slowing of economic growth and increased
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unemployment, further stalling recovery. Greece has struggled with both of these problems, as
will be discussed in a later section.
In any monetary union, the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation may arise, as
Mundell discussed and the Phillips curve models (with respect to a single country). One country
in the union can be booming with inflationary pressure from asymmetric positive demand
shocks, while a struggling country faces rising unemployment. He elaborates that this principle
does not apply to unstable or very large countries where there is no established international
monetary system due to the difficulty in maintaining fixed rates. With flexible exchange rates,
both countries would have the option to use monetary policy to alleviate these contrasting
problems (ex: printing money), which is not the case if they are linked either by fixed rates or a
monetary union.
Without either fiscal coordination between countries or “cross-border (or country)
compensation,” effective policy responses to asymmetric shocks in a monetary union are
difficult or near impossible. “Cross-border compensation” was addressed with respect to the
United States by Paul Krugman as the “automatic compensating transfer from the rest of the
country” to support a region in need (Gilsinan, 2015). This is where the United States and the
Eurozone differ, however. The United States is viewed as a nation state, where Federal programs
are intended for all states. When a state is experiencing economic hardship, other states
compensate by indirectly giving stimulus to the one that is struggling through the Federal
government. This is primarily due to the equal dependence of the states on Federal programs
supported by revenue from the states. This means that recessions in a given state hurt the whole
country. The Eurozone, in contrast, is not a nation state with fiscal unity (a coordination of fiscal
policies within the monetary union or a single fiscal policy applied to all members) and
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expectations of such support. The lack of fiscal unity within the EMU is one aspect of the
monetary union that has been challenged by economists in the midst of the economic hardships
endured by certain countries in the EMU because of the sovereign debt crisis. The Eurozone is
faced with the decision of whether or not to support Greece, one of the struggling countries, and
the consequences that would follow.
In the same 1997 speech, Mundell listed further reasons for countries, such as those
within the United Kingdom, to decide against a monetary union. One reason is to allow
flexibility for differing inflation rates. Another may be due to the added constraints on
macroeconomic policy (coordination efforts and meeting budget, debt-to-GDP ratio and interest
rate requirements). He ends his reasoning against the formation of a monetary union with the
idea of integration. A country may be hesitant or even refuse to adhere to the common standards
(treaty requirements) and fiscal policies of the rest of the area (referring to fiscal unity or fiscal
coordination). This integration has been one of the primary struggles facing the Eurozone, which
is composed of countries with diverse cultures and expectations of living standards. There are
also the disadvantages not mentioned by Mundell, such as loss of the confidentiality of
government statistics/data, difficulty in maintaining effective leadership and its resulting political
instability, and difficulty in establishing confidence in the permanence of a balanced budget.
A monetary union can be a powerful way to instill confidence in a body of countries and
strengthen each member (through underwriting and coordination efforts), however for many of
the reasons listed above (primarily the loss of independent monetary policy) it is better suited for
countries fitting within an “Optimal Currency Area.” This idea was proposed by Robert Mundell
in an article written in 1961, entitled “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas” (Mundell, 1968).
Mundell went on to receive the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1999 for this theory, the same year
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that 11 European countries adopted the euro. Mundell denies that the whole world would qualify
as an optimum currency area, which would call for a single worldwide currency as favored by
internationalists like economist John Stuart Mill (Mussey et al., 1909, p. 54). Mundell believes a
world currency could be practical for the future world economy (in easing international
transactions and, therefore, relations), but the current instability of the international monetary
system, makes today’s world far from that point (Corcoran, 2012). He instead defines the
“current optimal (currency) area” as an area with the “ability to stabilize national employment
and price levels” (Mundell, 1968). Employment instability is especially prevalent in Greece
which has the highest unemployment rate within the European Union with a rate of 24.6% as of
October 2015, a large number of which are young adults (“Unemployment statistics”, 2015).
Compared to the United States unemployment rate of 5%, as of November 2015, the euro area’s
rate as a whole is double ("National employment monthly update”, 2015).
Three of Mundell’s key points are as follows: Small countries within a monetary union
require budgetary discipline and are likely to need fiscal unity with larger members due to
different standards of living (generally higher expected living standards but lower means of
attaining those standards, an example being Greece); the more countries included in a monetary
union, the more insulation from shocks due to economic variety; and trading convenience can be
found in areas with more countries through variety of product options without the hassle of
exchange rate conversions. Greece’s lack of fiscal discipline leading to the debt crisis
demonstrates the first point Mundell makes. The second point may have reduced the severity of
the crisis, but has caused conflicts between political powers of different countries in the
negotiation processes (e.g. Greece and Germany). The last point is not clearly visible in the
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EMU, because although the euro eases trading, there is still an export/import imbalance between
countries, making some thrive over others.
An important factor influencing the relative advantages of an optimal currency area is the
degree of factor mobility. Factor mobility concerns the ease at which labor, capital, and other
factors of production can be transferred between countries. Mundell proposed a need for high
levels of mobility in a monetary union, pushing the markets within the union into equilibrium,
and low levels externally with other regions, to avoid an outflow of factors making the union
unsustainable. The exact level of mobility required for optimality is disputed (especially with
respect to its restriction on a country’s ability to tax those factors). Though in a later interview,
Mundell clarifies that the advantages of information availability and diminishing transaction
costs of a monetary union must overcome the problems of insufficient labor mobility (if they
exist) for a monetary union to be preferable, noting that insufficient labor mobility is not the
primary cause of the financial problems of Greece (Corcoran, 2012).
Another problem addressed in Mundell’s writings was a contagion effect similar to the
spread of the depression after 1929 that many economists believe resulted from the gold
standard. “Under a common currency, depression in one region would be transmitted to other
regions for precisely the same reasons (i.e., the reliance on the same medium of exchange)”
(Mundell, 1968). If the unemployment and other debt related problems experienced in Greece
were to flood into other countries already struggling, it could lead to an economic collapse of the
monetary union.
Mundell did make some incorrect assumptions about the formation of the European
Monetary Union, as did many economists at the time of its creation. Mundell believed that the
United Kingdom would choose to join the EMU with the costs of opting out (foregoing the
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benefits of the monetary union mentioned earlier) being as large as they were; however, it still
chose to opt out. As for Greece, Mundell correctly anticipated its acceptance into the Eurozone.
He did not, however, foresee its acceptance through the falsification of deficit records. There was
not a “real effort to put other elements of its economic house in order,” a house that recently
faced tribulations and was searching for the insurance of the monetary union (Mundell, 1997).
Mundell proceeded to assert that if not accepted into the Eurozone, Greece should still have fixed
the drachma to the euro with narrow margins and that the “more countries that join the bloc
(EMU), the greater will be its chance of success” (Mundell, 1997). Only the aftermath of the
crisis and the reactions of the monetary union as it learns from its mistakes will tell if Mundell
was correct on his last point.
Mundell is quoted as thinking of the euro as a political and economic triumph in 2012,
well after the beginning of the Greek crisis. Despite the lack of fiscal policy harmonization, he
stood by the assertion that the euro may one day replace the dollar as the international reserve
asset. He went on to say that a “grexit”, although possibly disastrous for Greece, could indeed
strengthen the union by cutting off the suffering entity and allowing for a quicker recovery for
the monetary union. Mundell continues to discuss a necessary shift from nation-states towards a
central power, with the European Commission as the executive power and the European Council
as the legislative power. Mundell also argues that fiscal unity is not a prerequisite for a wellfunctioning monetary union, referencing the United States and Canada as examples. He promotes
the distribution of responsibilities (including fiscal policy, defense, and social security) between
the European Commission (“federal power”) and the individual countries “on grounds of
efficiency and economic justice, not on grounds that they are necessary for monetary union”
(Corcoran, 2012). He effectively states that powers are assigned based on what is efficient and
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effective for the unique area or country and are not based on a set of universal rules, one fiscal
policy may not fit all members of the union.
“The steps that are needed to resolve the crisis will move Europe toward a more perfect
union,” Mundell wrote (Corcoran, 2012). This crisis has forced the EMU to work together
toward future solutions and preventative measures (e.g. more restrictive regulatory enforcement
by the SGP). A careful examination of the existing literature about monetary unions prior to the
Maastricht Treaty in 1999 would have presented some of the warning signs of possible future
distress and could have prevented some of the repercussions of the crisis. Slowly, the EMU may
achieve “a more perfect union,” but for now they still have much to learn about the mistakes that
were made and what parties made them.
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2. The Situation in Greece
Despite the warning signs that were present prior to Greece’s admittance into the
Eurozone, Greece continued on a trajectory towards its current instability. The last year (2015)
has included bailouts, referendums, elections, and bank shutdowns, but the circumstances Greece
finds itself in cannot be explained solely by the events of last year, because it was the
culmination of thirty years of fiscal irresponsibility and misplaced trust in the existing
governance. Starting in late 2009, the sovereign debt crisis would begin to reveal many of the
cracks already present in the decade old European Monetary Union.
In order to truly understand the current situation in Greece, it is important to have a brief
overview of what brought Greece to where it is today. Greece’s culture can be described as “laid
back.” There is a strong focus on family, from children living with their parents until marriage to
taking care of their grandparents regardless of the expense. Similar to a few European countries,
Greeks would eat out regularly and rest after the big meal. They spent their money while they
could still get good credit. Starting in the 1980s corruption bled out of the political system. The
two major political parties (PASOK, the moderate left party, and New Democracy, the moderate
right party) would direct government spending to benefit their supporters either through
government jobs or in the private sectors (Mchugh, July 2015). Tax evasion also entered the
scene as another way to line the pockets of the corrupt. Additionally, Greece’s media were
“intertwined with the political structure, which prevented reporting of financial mismanagement”
(Shorto, 2012). Not until the EMU was beginning to form did Greece have to acknowledge their
excessive debt accumulation. Greece was not initially allowed to join the EMU. Only after policy
revisions and deficit reductions were they allowed to join the monetary union in 2001. Along
with many of the aforementioned reasons for joining a monetary union, Greece also sought the
20

lower credit terms linked to the euro. With such favorable credit after admittance, Greece quickly
fell back into its earlier debt activities and corrupt practices. None of this is to say that Greeks
are not just as hard working as other countries. In 2008 Greeks worked on average 1,000 more
hours than Germans (Shorto, 2012). Greece just grew accustomed to borrowing and regularly
refinancing their debt. The initial lower interest rates of the Eurozone lured them in, but when
their debt was uncovered they became stuck in what is called a “debt-trap” (i.e., borrowing and
acquiring debt to the point even more would have to be borrowed just to pay off the interest),
which will be elaborated on in the section on corruption.
Greece had been running deficits every year from the mid-1990s (“Greece Government
Budget”, 2016). In 2004, Greece held the summer Olympics, adding another €9 billion to public
expenditures and marking the most expensive Games to be held up to that point (Malkoutzis,
2012). €7 billion was supposed to be supported by taxes, but consistent with Greece’s history of
tax evasion, much of it was funded through additional borrowing (“Greece Crisis: How did It Get
This Bad”, 2015). That same year (2004), Greece admitted to falsifying deficit information to
enter the Eurozone with the help of Goldman Sachs through a series of swap agreements
(Dunbar, 2003). There is still no agreement over how the debt was able to build up for so long or
how Greece was able to keep it hidden so well even with help they received from Goldman
Sachs. When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, banks began to restrict lending, forcing
Greece to look to the European Union and the International Monetary Fund for support.
In February of 2010, the first austerity plan for Greece was set in motion after facing
pressure from both the EU and the European Commission. A freeze was placed on public-sector
wages and taxes were increased. Just a month later, another fiscal package was approved by the
European Commission, which consisted of even more public-sector pay cuts and tax increases
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(VAT, consumption, and income). It came as no surprise that in the following two months S&P
downgraded Greek government bonds to junk status and a €110 billion bailout package was
agreed to by IMF and Eurozone leaders. Downgrades continued into 2011, resulting in Greece
possessing the “world’s lowest-rated sovereign debt” (Ray, 2015). The year 2011 only produced
further austerity measures and rescue packages. One package in particular was for €109 billion
from European Union leaders in which existing loans were restructured with more generous
terms for Greece. Greece was also labeled as being in “selective” or temporary default by Fitch
as a result of their second bailout.
A meeting of Greece’s creditors in 2011 set forth a series of bond swaps that would cut
Greek debt in half by switching existing debt for new debt with half of the face value. During the
course of the year, the European Stability Mechanism was created to be a lender of last resort for
countries in the Eurozone that were struggling. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
was also expanded. The EFSF is a company that aims to “preserve financial stability of Europe’s
monetary union by providing temporary financial assistance to euro area member states if
needed” (“European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)”, 2013). The expansion of scope
included the ability to guarantee commitments for €780 billion by issuing debt instruments and
intervening in the debt markets (both primary and secondary). In November of 2011, a “grexit”
was publically declared as a possibility during a summit of G20 leaders, promoting further doubt
in the stability of Greece. G20 stands for “Group of Twenty” and is a gathering that includes a
representative from the ECB and European Council as well as finance ministers and central bank
governors from France, Germany, Italy, and 16 other countries. That same month, George
Andreas Papandreou resigned as the 11th Prime Minister of Greece, ending his two-year term. It
was during his term that much of the deception about the budget deficit by the New Democracy
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party in previous terms was uncovered. Two days after Papandreou’s resignation, Lucas
Papademos was sworn in as the interim Prime Minister. The end of the year was accompanied by
an initial discussion of steps to take towards fiscal integration of the Eurozone by European
leaders on December 9th, the 20th anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty. There was also
discussion on extension of loans to over 500 European banks by the European Central Bank in an
attempt to prevent a credit freeze, making it the largest package of loans in ECB history.
The stability compact discussed in December of 2011 was finalized on January 30th of
2012 and was intended to impose fiscal discipline on member states that were in agreement. Of
the 27 European Union members, 25 agreed to the compact, which was signed on March 2nd.
All Eurozone countries (including Greece) were required to comply with fiscal unity, but others
outside of the monetary union had the choice to do so. In February, Greece increased its austerity
measures, opening the door to a bailout of € 130 billion from the “Troika” of the International
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Union. The discussion of a
“grexit” in 2011 resulted in massive withdrawals from Greek banks, €700 million on May 14th
alone (Ray, 2015). Following still more spending cuts, the New Democracy party had a narrow
victory on June 17th. In October, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize due to
its ability to transform “most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace” (Ray,
2015). Although the avoidance of war was achieved, economic conflicts were not entirely
avoided.
The most notable event in 2013 was the Eurozone’s emergence from the recession with
GDP growth of 0.3% in August. In the midst of such positive news of the road to recovery for
the Eurozone, Greece continued fighting the existing austerity in the year 2014. An anti-austerity
party, Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), rose to the top, followed by political riots due to the
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failure to elect a successor for Karolos Papoulias. In the midst of the unrest in Greece, the ECB
pushed deposit rates down to -0.1%, effectively charging a fee on banks for holding reserves in
an attempt to spur lending. This marked the first time a major central bank had done this. Rates
were further cut in September to -0.2%.
2015 included a continuation of the political unrest that was prevalent in Greece,
beginning with the election of Alexis Tsipras as Prime Minister, the leader of the Syriza party.
His election was based on the promise of finding ways around the harsh austerity measures
Greece was enduring. Despite his negotiations, Tsipras failed to extend Greece’s loans in June,
resulting in an official default of Greece’s sovereign debt and a suspension of the Athens stock
exchange on June 30th. Towards the middle of the year it became clear to many Greek citizens
that Tsipras was unable to block austerity measures while maintaining Greece’s position in the
union, which resulted in even more protesting. In an attempt to involve the people, Tsipras held a
controversial referendum in July as to whether Greece would accept the bailout terms provided
by the Troika. Tsipras had urged Greeks to reject the terms in the referendum. Many believed a
“no” vote would most definitely result in a “grexit”, however when that “no” vote occurred, to
many people’s shock, Greece was not forced out of the Eurozone. A bailout package was agreed
upon just a week later for €86 billion along with more austerity measures, despite the protests.
The IMF then proceeded to criticize “the terms imposed by its Troika partners, stating that
Greece’s debt can only be made sustainable by enacting significant debt-relief measures” (Ray,
2015). In another attempt to put the people in control and discover their true desires, Tsipras held
a snap election in September. This was yet another risky decision to make in a time of such
instability, but the decision paid off for him as Tsipras was re-elected, claiming “victory of the
people.”
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The situation in Greece will continue to evolve as Eurozone leaders meet routinely to
discuss fiscal integration as well as further evaluate the causes of the crisis. It is important to note
that Greece is not solely responsible for the severity of its crisis, although its role was the
primary focus of this section. Part of the responsibility lies with the monetary union for its failure
to police (detect and prevent fiscal policy issues before problems arise, such as extreme deficits,
that would affect the monetary union), as well as with rating agencies that failed to detect trouble
ensuing from Greece’s decisions and therefore failed to protect investors. Every party involved
in the debt crisis has a role in its creation and is affected by it and its repercussion.

Figure 2. Greece’s Inflation Rate from 1960 to 2016. Inflation has steadily decreased from 1991.
Copyright 2016 by Trading Economics.
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Figure 3. Greece’s Gross Domestic Product from 1995 to 2015. A large drop and rebound
occurred in 2009. Copyright 2016 by Trading Economics.

Figure 4. Greece’s Government Spending to GDP from 1995 to 2014. In comparison, Germany’s
spending has not surpassed 48% of GDP since their admittance into the Eurozone. Copyright
2016 by Trading Economics.
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Figure 5. Greece’s Government Debt to GDP from 1980 to 2015. There is a steady increase,
with the exception of the years leading up to the admittance of Greece into the Eurozone until
their falsified data was exposed in 2004. Copyright 2016 by Trading Economics.

Figure 6. Greece’s Unemployment Rate from 1998 to 2015. Unemployment increased from the
end of 2008 until 2014, where it began to gradually decline. Copyright 2016 by Trading
Economics.
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3. Greek Corruption
Corrupt financial practices by Greece’s public sector were not unique to the crisis, but
predated it. Corruption data has been available for over two decades and should have been an
indicator of the financial state of Greece, warned creditors, and provided incentives for Greece to
start in a new direction. However, corruption has only now led to the distrust of Greece by other
countries and investors in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis. This distrust is corrosive when
negotiating the terms of Greece’s liabilities. Such a lack of faith in Greece’s government stems
from corrupt practices such as tax evasion and misreporting of financial ratios (debt and deficit
to GDP ratios). For example, in 2010, 89.5% of total tax receipts in Greece were not collected,
compared to the 2.3% not collected in Germany (O’Brien, 2015). Indicators like the Corruption
Perception Index help to inform investors of these corrupt practices through a country’s
perceived corruption rating.
Corruption is defined as a “dishonest or illegal behavior, especially by powerful people”
(“Merriam-Webster”). The Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, hereby
referred to as the CPI (not to be confused with the Consumer Price Index), is the most widely
used public sector corruption measure in the world. By using both surveyed perceptions and
economic and financial records for analysis, a variety of data are gathered to shield against the
use of unreliable data that may have been corrupted. Perceptions, unlike past records which are
provided by the government, are less influenced by a possibly corrupt public sector and when
combined with the other data, can create a better picture of a country’s economic condition. The
uncovering of Greece’s falsified financial data is a perfect example of tainted data reporting.
Greece was able to disguise its massive amount of debt with help from Goldman Sachs, which
assisted its admittance into the EMU (Wienberg, 2011).
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The index is a collection of surveys and assessments based on data from the past 24
months to arrive at a rating. Data sources are “independent institutions specializing in
governance and business climate analysis” and each country reported must have a minimum of
three of these sources (“How corrupt is your country?”). Countries are ranked from zero (highly
corrupt) to 100 (very little to no corruption), although they are often referred to using a scale
from zero to ten. To put these numbers into perspective, in 2011, corruption scores were 3.4, 3.9,
8, and 9 for Greece, Italy, Germany, and Finland, respectively. This shows Greece as the most
corrupt and Finland as the least within the group.
In order to standardize the scores of different sources, Transparency International uses a
software package called STAT to impute scores for sources when the data is not available for a
country. The credibility of this index was evaluated by the European Commission’s Joint
Research Centre in 2012 and they deemed the data to be sufficiently “robust” in the index’s key
assumptions regarding global parameters. The CPI was also found to have accurately taken
significant country differences into consideration and have little redundancy (Saisana, 2012).
Until corruption is addressed and eliminated around the globe, the Corruption Perceptions Index
will continue to be an important indicator of countries’ economic health and progress.
Research by Pankaj K. Jain, Emre Kuvvet, and Michael S. Pagano found that there was a
nonlinear relationship, distinct from other variables such as downgrades or announcements,
between corruption and foreign investment (Jain et at., 2014). Their research found that
intermediate levels of corruption result in the greatest negative effect on foreign investment
when controlling for other factors, a result consistent with our analysis discussed below. This
proves to be especially relevant for Greece as they fall towards the middle of the Transparency
International’s CPI rating scale.
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In yet another paper discussing the role of corruption in an economy, Carolina Achury,
Christos Koulovatianos, and John Tsoukalas sought to address the impact of rent-seeking groups
on sovereign interest rates with the included impact of corruption, through deriving the MarkovNash Political Equilibrium. “Our model serves as a tool for demonstrating that corruption is a
structural problem in a monetary union, needing to be treated as such a type of problem.”
(Achury et al., 2011). The paper discussed how countries with high debt-to-GDP ratio are likely
to fall into a high interest rate trap that cannot be fixed with monetary policy if under a monetary
union. A high interest rate trap is where sufficiently high interest rates keep countries from being
able to service their debt, resulting in the need to issue additional debt to finance it (perpetually
increasing debt). This is where a bailout plan comes into play. A bailout attempts to stop the
cycle by writing off a portion of the debt or lowering the lending rate to reduce the outstanding
debt-to-GDP ratio. In countries where “rent seeking” is high (rent seekers are those who use
another person’s resources for their own economic gain without benefiting society, such as
special-interest groups lobbying to get government funding), there appears to be a large positive
correlation between corruption and sovereign debt (debt-to-GDP). As a result of the reallocation
of taxes (expropriation of public resources) to these rent seekers, the impatience for public goods
and services increases with the misperception that taxes are going to social programs benefiting
the public instead of to the rent seekers. In order to service these desires, the government issues
more debt. Sufficient debt pushes interest rates up once more and leads the country into the high
interest rate trap. The solution that the authors present is that when addressing a corrupt country,
the goal should be to eliminate rent-seeking groups first. This is because when there are
structural problems like tax evasion or rent seeking within a country, corruption seeps to the core
of that country and can’t easily be swept away. Corruption has been linked statistically to
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increasing debt in other studies such as Chakrabarti and Zeaiter’s examination of the effect of
political risks on sovereign default (Chakrabarti & Zeaiter, 2014, pg 307). Their study showed
that an increase in corruption was significantly positively correlated to an increase in sovereign
debt, a result that is consistent with Jain et al.’s results as well as the case of Greece.
As can be seen from the literature on the subject, corruption and debt are intertwined and
feed into one another. Corruption breeds economic instability and only leads a country further
into debt. With Greece’s CPI rating, everybody should have been aware of the structural
problems that needed to be addressed far before its admittance into the Eurozone. Even investors
have been responsible for continuing to lend to Greece, essentially helping it into its
unsustainable debt levels. Investors, however, were often blind to the possibility of default, with
their over-reliance on stronger European countries underwriting the debt or on the EMU
imposing structural reform to prevent default.
To examine the relationship between corruption and interest rates, a regression was run
between one-year interest rates and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The results are shown on
the next page.
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Table 1
Regression Analysis on the Effect Changes in CPI have on One-Year Interest Rates
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.60414
0.36499
0.31614
0.00951
15

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Changes in Greece's CPI Rank

1
13
14

SS
MS
F
Significance F
0.00068 0.00068 7.47208
0.01707
0.00118 0.00009
0.00185

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
0.00166
0.00247 0.67282 0.51284
-0.08283
0.03030 -2.73351 0.01707

Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
-0.00367
0.00700
-0.00367
0.00700
-0.14830
-0.01737
-0.14830
-0.01737

The regression is a simplified event analysis, which shows a negative correlation between
changes in the CPI and Greek interest rates. An event analysis addresses the days leading up to a
certain event and the days following the event to find any differences that may be caused by the
event. In this case, the event is the release of the CPI by Transparency International. As a result
of the inconsistent release date of the CPI each year, little spuriousness has been assumed for the
sake of a general analysis. The simple regression uses percentage changes in the CPI, calculated
using the natural log of year t over year t-1 (prior year), against percent changes in the one-year
interest rates. The ratings were provided by Transparency International and the interest rate data
were provided by Bloomberg. Although this analysis fails to take many other variables into
consideration, it supports previous research by finding a negative relationship between
corruption ratings and investment.
In addition to the negative correlation found in our regression for Greece, it was also
discovered that Germany and Italy have a negative relationship between the two variables, but it
was not found to be statistically significant. Only Greece’s negative correlation between
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corruption and one-year interest rates were determined statistically significant, as can be seen by
the p-value of less than 0.05. This exhibits the same behavior as discussed by Jain et al. where
Greece is neither the most corrupt country, nor the least, and changes in corruption have a
significant effect (Jain et al., 2014). The spotlight Greece is currently in and the stakes it faces
with a possible “grexit” place it in a unique situation among EMU countries.
If Greeks had taken charge to improve their reputation by correcting tax evasion and
working against rent-seekers, they would have likely fared much better, especially with respect
to negotiation processes. Instead, Greece backed itself into even more corrupt practices to cover
up the trap they had fallen into. One example of this was discovered in July of 2003, when
financial journalist Nick Dunbar revealed Goldman Sachs’ role in hiding Greece’s high
government deficits, a violation of the Maastricht Treaty, through a series of swaps agreements
(Dunbar, 2003). The disclosed debt arrangements with Goldman Sachs and continuous revisions
of Greece’s existing derivatives contracts only further hurt Greece’s standing (Dunbar, 2012).
Although the derivatives were complex, hiding financial conditions could have and should have
been prevented. Greece was well aware of its corrupt standing and should have addressed the
problem before entering a monetary union.
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Part III: The Negligence of the Parties Involved

1. The Failure of the EMU to Prevent and Respond to the Debt Crisis

Although countries such as Germany appear to be picking up the pieces of the mess
Greece has made, it, like the rest of the monetary union, are at least in part to blame for allowing
reckless borrowing.
Koutsoukis (2014) argues:
The lack of an EU-wide political union is a systemic fault that allowed nearly all of the
EU economies to stray, more or less, from the Maastricht criteria- not only Greece. This
important flaw which allows Greece and other weak economies of the Eurozone to
become highly vulnerable to the markets and subsequently their international positioning
until the EU institutions become aware to the problem(s) and react accordingly. (p. 30)
Even in an attempt to help Greece recover through a series of austerity measures and
bailout packages, the Eurozone may have made the situation worse. The strain put on Greece’s
economy by the harsh austerity measures diminished growth and made long-term structural
changes less achievable. Greeks often felt forced to choose whether to live in the economic
distress caused by harsh austerity measures or be forced out of the Eurozone. This created even
more international doubt in the stability of Greece. The constant blows to investor confidence
further limited Greece’s solvency. The International Monetary Fund acknowledged the mistake it
and the rest of the Troika made of “underestimating how much the austerity measures it pushed
would pinch the country’s already faltering economy” (Olster, 2013). The IMF also admitted its
failure in letting Greek debt remain high for so long. Although, according to the IMF, a success
of the bailouts was the continued presence of Greece in the Eurozone and the prevention of the
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spread of the crisis. Despite creditors being partially responsible for Greece’s condition, Greece
was still responsible for its stalling of structural reforms (privatizations and tax reforms) that
further worsened their economy.
Throughout bail-out negotiations, Germany has been on the forefront of the argument for
increased austerity measures. Many have deemed the sentiment of Germany towards Greece as
overly harsh. According to former Social Democratic foreign and finance ministers, FrankWalter Steinmeier and Peer Steinbrück, Germany appeared to attempt to make the European
Monetary Union resemble Germany, rather than work towards a “European Germany” (Young,
2011). The extent of the austerity measures was no longer the decision of the monetary union as
a whole, but primarily Germany’s standards enforced on others. Germany has such power due to
its economic strength in relation to the monetary union and its primary role as a creditor.
European leaders did respond to such doubts about the austerity measures by combining them
with the restructuring of debt agreements.
The cultural clash between member countries during the course of the crisis also made a
huge impact. German citizens, for example, were often “up in arms” about bailing out Greece as
a result of its poor fiscal discipline. In contrast, Greece blamed attacks on bonds (due to drastic
drops in credit ratings) and unrealistic austerity measures for their ailments. There also appeared
to be fear on the part of France to challenge Germany on its positions, as “an open conflict with
Germany could frighten the markets even more and thus endanger the euro” (Young, 2011). The
coordination between France and Germany, although helpful for the larger countries, has
prevented creative solutions and may ultimately hinder the fiscal unity of the entire EMU, and
possibly force less stable countries out. The vision for political union seen 25 years ago does not
hold true in the eyes of Germany any more. The generational gap from the World Wars has
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caused current leaders to be unaware of the devastation caused in the relationships between
countries during those times that spurred the initial desire for unity. Without the impact of the
wars resonating with this generation, it has become far easier for European leaders like Angela
Merkel (Chancellor of Germany) to imagine a politically divided Europe. However, with such
division a monetary union may not be sustainable. More economically powerful countries may
decide it is better to band together without the suffering countries or the suffering countries may
decide the standards imposed by the more powerful countries are too harsh to endure.
In his book Boomerang, Michael Lewis (2011) refers to the notion of a two-tier
European Union as conceived by Wilhelm Nölling, a German politician and economics professor
at Hamburg University. The first tier would be the countries with similar economic structures,
such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, and France. The second tier, referred to as
the “deadbeats”, would be countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. The irony is very
clear with the European Union receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for “advancing the
causes of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” yet political tensions
have formed between the tiers over the course of the crisis (“European Union receives Nobel
Peace Prize 2012”, 2016). Despite democracy being emphasized in the award, Greece has
struggled to have its own needs met (and voice heard) by the Eurozone leaders to the same level
as other member countries, an example being its unemployment rates almost 15% above the
European average and youth unemployment rates almost 28% above the average in 2014
(“Unemployment Statistics”, 2015). With Spain in a similar situation, it isn’t hard to argue that
although the European Union works towards improvements, there are countries that are being
left in its dust. A survey by Europa indicated “a majority in Greece, Austria, Slovenia, the
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Netherlands and Sweden disagree that the (Nobel) award was the right choice” (“European
Union receives Nobel Peace Prize 2012”, 2016).
This can all be attributed to the inability of the European Monetary Union to prevent the
crisis from developing and effectively respond to the distress caused by the debt crisis. Further,
the EMU can be accused of being negligent in their monitoring of member countries to begin
with. If the fiscal adherence to Maastricht treaty conditions by countries like Greece were to have
been more strictly policed by the leaders of the EMU, the magnitude of debt accumulation and
the repercussions may have been significantly reduced. As Mundell predicted, smaller countries
like Greece would require budgetary discipline and likely fiscal unity. In response to criticisms
of poor oversight, the EU has worked on reforms to significantly improve their governance.
These reforms aim to “strengthen enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact, introduce
greater surveillance of national budgets by the European Commission, and establish an early
warning mechanism that would prevent or correct macroeconomic imbalances within and
between member states” (Nelson et al., 2011, p. 18) as well as spur further political integration of
the EU.
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2. Rating Agency Recklessness
The ease at which Greece borrowed was significantly increased with the high credit
ratings associated with its admittance into the EMU. “We wanted to upgrade the country
(Greece) on the belief that Greece was now part of the euro zone and that nobody was ever going
to default and that everything was safe,” Sara Bertin, an economist working at Moody’s, said
about the discussion to upgrade Greece in 2001 (Creswell & Graham, 2011). The debt levels
were further supported by the seemingly misplaced optimism in Greece’s sovereign debt position
by rating agencies until drastic downgrades were made further into the crisis. High credit ratings
encouraged investment in the country and gave Greece more borrowing opportunities. Many of
the rating agencies couldn’t imagine the EMU letting a member country reach the point of
becoming a “deadbeat” (Creswell & Graham, 2011). Even after Greece’s misreported financials
were recovered, ratings did not immediately change. A leader of Moody’s sovereign debt group
during the time even commented on the knowledge of the generally inaccurate data produced by
Greece (Creswell & Graham, 2011). With an existing understanding of the corruption, it is
almost shocking that Greece was rated so highly until it was uncovered that the rating agencies
were paid for their ratings to be issued. Without the ratings, Greece would have been unable to
issue sovereign debt. Although the agencies insist on separation between the ratings process and
business activities (being paid by the countries they rate), the negligence has brought forth the
questioning of the authenticity of that statement.
The unexpected effect the ratings agencies had on the Greek economy as a result of their
downgrades of Greece’s sovereign debt was a tremendous one. One reflection and determinant of
confidence is how the debt of a country is rated. The three largest credit rating agencies are
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, all of which can be accused of poorly performing their
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duties leading up to the crisis. Investors look to these agencies for reliable information on the
quality and riskiness of debt. They, however, failed to do their due diligence and rated Greek
debt much higher than deserved for an extended period of time. These agencies appeared to rely
primarily on the concerns of political leaders for ratings forecasts rather than the economic data
(Koutsoukis, 2014). Evidence of this is shown in the diminishing economic fundamentals in the
years leading up to a public announcement of corrupt reporting of financials, but the rating
agencies delayed revising their rating until the corruption was exposed or even after that, as was
the case with Moody’s. Until the beginning of the financial crisis, Moody’s spent little attention
on sovereign debt issues.
The European Union and European Central Bank asserted “S&P’s April 2010 decision to
downgrade Greece’s debt to junk status weakened investor confidence, raised the cost of
borrowing, and made a financial rescue package in May 2010 all but inevitable” (“The credit
rating controversy”, 2015). This also raises the concern of how informed the ratings agencies are
staying with respect to perceived corruption. Ratings are determined through analyses of
financial ratios, credit obligations, and political risks. Anything relevant to the confidence of
investors in a security is meant to be included in the ratings process, however the unreliable
ratings during the crisis, have caused the agencies to be questioned. Even Moody’s new
“methodology” for rating countries that was introduced in 2008, was “more of a checklist”
without a deep empirical analysis, according to Sara Bertin, the lead analyst on Greece for
Moody’s until 2008 (Creswell & Graham, 2011). Greece’s sovereign debt was rated as CC+ by
S&P, Caa3 by Moody’s, and CCC by Fitch in December of 2015 (“Greece | credit rating”, 2015).
The ratings correspond to being in default with little prospect for recovery. To add perspective,
in 2002 Moody’s and S&P rated Greek long-term government debt A+, with this investment
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grade rating continuing until 2009 (Milne, 2010). The drastic drops in credit ratings occurred
primarily between 2009 and 2010. Moody’s states that “the irrevocable breakdown in relations
with external creditors” will only continue the poor creditworthiness of Greece and thus will be
reflected by additional drops in ratings, such as the one on July 1st of last year ("Moody's
downgrades Greece's government bond rating to Caa3; on review for further downgrade", 2015).
The agencies cast doubt over whether the situation in Greece will ever improve and create
concern regarding the toll yet to be taken on the creditors during the journey. These fears are
likely to materialize in investor expectations of higher yet riskier returns.
This poor reporting ranges from mortgage back securities (specifically in the US) to the
sovereign debt crisis. Sara Bertin noted the same issue of over-optimism that contributed to the
subprime crisis; The rating agencies never conceived of these catastrophes as a possibility
(Creswell & Graham, 2011). The proceeding downgrades of European sovereign debt were
guilty of intensifying or accelerating the crisis. “When you get multiple ratings or large ratings
downgrades, it is fair to say as a criticism that the ratings were too high in the first place.
Looking back, that indicates that the assumptions being made in the past were too optimistic,”
said David H. Levey, co-head of Moody’s sovereign debt group until 2004 (Creswell & Graham,
2011). In 2010 and 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act was passed and the European Securities and
Markets Authority was created, respectively, both aiming to shield investors from similar
negligence in the future. Despite these initiatives, many continue to fight against the immense
influence these agencies have on investment decisions.
This is not to say that the investors should be relying solely on these ratings. “In a world
in which Eurozone countries are increasingly seen as heterogeneous, investors need to
understand not just budgetary and financial matters but even the internal politics of each nation”
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(Milne,2010) in order to protect themselves, the responsibility to be well-informed also lies with
the investor. Investors should be aware of the issues that exist in the country they are investing
in, such as the corruption perception index and the massive spending and borrowing in Greece.
Both the reckless investing on the part of investors and the misreporting of the ratings agencies
contributed to the severity of the crisis.

Figure 7. Greece’s 10-Year Government Bond Yields alongside its Average Long-Term Credit
Rating and the events corresponding to the changes. Copyright 2015 by Reuters.
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Part IV: The Implications

1. If Greece Stays
As of a bailout achieved on July 13, 2015, Greece’s continued membership in the
Eurozone now appears far more likely. The Greek government committed to some of the
difficult austerity measures of increasing value-added tax (a consumption tax), decreasing
pensions, and increasing retirement age that were treated as tests by its Eurozone partners (Kirby,
2015). Even with Greece passing this test, that is not an indicator that future tests will have the
same results. This is especially the case with the Syriza party still in power, which continues to
promise lessened austerity and a return to Greece’s previous standard of living. More than half of
Greece’s citizens still believe the euro is good for the country (see Figure 3), meaning they are
willing to cooperate with the creditors and their austerity measures to maintain it. Figure 4
depicts some of the strongest Eurozone countries and their opinions on the retention of Greece,
with a majority in Germany in favor of a “grexit.” Such opposition will only make the monetary
union harder to maintain.
Greece staying in the EMU would occur under two separate equilibria, according to
Jeffrey Frankel (Frankel, 2015). Frankel addressed the situation in Greece through a game theory
perspective. In order to have Greece stay in the European Monetary Union, Greece or Germany
would have to give up some of its priorities, a “bad bargain” (someone would have to lose). The
only other way to achieve a “good bargain” would be for Greece and its creditors to readjust
their priorities. This would require creditors being more generous with their terms and Greece
following through on the promised structural reforms, such as more serious tax reform and
spending cuts.
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If Greece were to continue to not fully commit to the structural changes proposed by
European leaders, this could create increased political strife and discord within Greece. The
radical left Syriza ran on the promise of decreasing austerity measures and although steps have
been made towards reform, it has not changed its objective. The Eurozone will have to be very
cautious in dealing with this government in order to not spark similar radical governments
forming in countries like Spain. “This political contagion could be very damaging, leading to far
worse risks than just Greece leaving the Euro” (Elliott, 2015). If austerity were to continue in the
direction it has been, Greece’s growth will continue to suffer. “Austerity economics was always
meant as a short, sharp shock, not a coherent economic policy” (Jenkins, 2015). Greece has
suffered in the last few years and austerity economics does not seem like it will be ending for
them in the short run. Even if austerity measures were to ease, the Eurozone must create a longterm solution that unites the extremely diverse group of countries in a sustainable way.
Another key issue is the continuation of what is referred to as the “Greek brain drain,” in
which intelligent people migrate out of Greece to richer countries for better wages and lifestyles.
The ease of migration between Eurozone countries and the common currency (not having to
worry about exchanging one currency for another in a new location) facilitates the movement.
There are about 180,000 Greek professionals that choose to work abroad, even more study
abroad due to the instability of Greece (S.N., 2015). These professionals are young and talented,
resulting in the remaining residents in Greece on average being older with less innovative
capabilities. If prospects for Greece do not improve, the “brain drain” will continue as graduates
and professionals seek out viable career opportunities elsewhere. Many of those still in Greece
are working in jobs they are extremely overqualified for primarily due to the discouraging work
environment (S.N., 2015). The same problem might be present if Greece were to separate, but
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with the prospect for growth, some of the entrepreneurial “brains” may return in hopes of helping
the country restart. If this outflow of intellectual people to other European countries is to stop,
Greece will have to work hard to improve its current intellectual prospects by encouraging
entrepreneurialism and innovation in the business sector.
There are those who argue that if Greece were to have left the EMU in 2008, the recovery
for Greece might have gone much smoother on the theory that growth would have been spurred
as opposed to being hurt. This would be because in response to the economic distress, Greece
would have the option to use monetary policy to stimulate the economy and not had to endure
the admittedly overly harsh austerity measures. For the time being, the Chairman of the ECB,
Mario Draghi, has made his stance very clear based on the ECB’s duty “to act based on the
assumption that Greece is and will be a member of the euro area” (Kirby, 2015).

Figure 8. A survey conducted by some of the weaker countries within the Eurozone on whether
they believed the euro was a good thing for their country. Although the percentage of those that
agree it is beneficial has gone down, most (with the exception of Italy) remain over 50%.
Copyright 2015 by the Economist.

44

Figure 9. Survey conducted of economically stronger European countries on their opinions of a
possible “grexit.” The top number in each circle indicates the percentage of the population of that
country that prefers if Greece stays, the middle is the percentage that prefers it leaves and the
remainder do not know. A minority for each country believes Greece should remain. Copyright
2015 by Forbes.
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2. If Greece Goes
Since no country has left the Eurozone so far, the process of a “grexit” and the
consequences following cannot be predicted, but possible results can be considered. Frankel
(2015) refers to a “grexit” as a consequence of a “non-cooperative equilibrium” where the sides
are unable to reach an agreement. Although there are arguments that Greece would be able to
reestablish a competitive position in the long run through structural changes and improvements
in its business sector, the short run economic changes that would have to first take place will be
painful for the Greeks.
If Greece were to separate from the Eurozone, it would have to either create a new
currency or revert back to the drachma (more likely the latter). Greece’s first action following a
secession, would be the devaluation of its new currency. This would help it to refocus on exports
in the global marketplace as a result of the high import prices. High import prices and relatively
low purchasing power compared to the rest of the Eurozone would be a result of the weaker
Greek currency. The drachma has been predicted to drop in value by 50% or more if adopted
and monetary policy is increasingly used (D. Mchugh, Feb. 2015). Economists predict Greece’s
economy would contract 10% within the first year of leaving the Eurozone (D. Mchugh, Feb.
2015). There is an argument that the focus on domestic goods would strengthen the economy in
terms of employment and GDP (Koutsoukis, 2014). However, it is important to note that living
standards may fall as inflation increases. This inflation would likely result from increased
spending to stimulate the economy (fiscal policy) or financing debt payments by printing money
(monetary policy). A likely benefit of the weaker drachma would be a boost in the Greek tourist
industry.
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Until the currency for the monetarily independent Greece fully replaced the euro, there
would most likely be large deposit withdrawals of euros to hold onto the stronger currency. To
prevent the chaos large withdrawals would cause, the government would likely take similar
actions to freeze accounts that it took in June of 2015 (Blackstone, 2015). Whether Greece would
be able to borrow is disputed. There are historical cases where countries rising out of debt crises
are able to borrow at favorable terms (Koutsoukis, 2014). There are also economists who believe
there will be an adjustment period where borrowing will be greatly limited (“What Would
Happen if Greece Quits the Euro?”, 2015). This may result in a circulation of “IOU’s,” acting as
an interim currency during the transition away from the euro.
In the business sector of Greece, the conversion process from euros to drachmas could
prove to be chaotic. There would be legal disputes and businesses owing euro-denominated debt
may be unable to pay their obligations, resulting in insolvency and bankruptcy. This would not
only hurt Greece’s economy, but any of Greece’s business partners. As for the remaining
countries in the Eurozone, government spending cuts may result from a fear of a similar loss in
investor confidence, as mentioned later on, resulting in recessions once more (“What Would
Happen if Greece Quits the Euro?”, 2015).
On a larger scale, the “grexit” would affect the outlook on the monetary union as a whole.
One possible result would be richer countries hesitating in the future towards lending to
struggling member countries, which could lead to severe economic distress for those countries.
In the United States, it is unlikely that the Federal government would fail to support a state in
serious need. If the “grexit” occurs, however, countries like Germany may be willing to let other
members suffer through it. Additionally, just as a moral hazard problem exists from third parties
like Germany and the ECB backing Greece’s debt leading to expectations about future support,
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an example may be set of the repercussions of poor fiscal discipline if Greece were to leave. The
separation of countries, no matter their condition, results in further speculation over the fragility
of the Eurozone. If Greece were to exit and do well, countries may consider following its
footsteps if times become difficult in the monetary union due to asymmetric shocks. This is
especially likely for countries such as Spain and Portugal that already have anti-austerity
movements.
The other possible result is a more beneficial one for the Eurozone (though not for
Greece), in which the monetary union thrives while Greece suffers, thereby showing the
consequences of fiscal irresponsibility. This could act as a “lesson” for countries such as Italy
and Spain, which have followed similar debt patterns. If fiscal discipline were to follow, it could
further unify the remaining countries into a stronger monetary union. Another probable result
would be that people in vulnerable Eurozone countries would move their money to safer
countries like Germany to avoid similar hardships as Greece (“What Would Happen if Greece
Quits the Euro?”, 2015). As mentioned earlier, the responsibility for the crisis does not fall
solely on Greece’s financial negligence, but on its creditors as well for feeding into the debt.
Countries such as Germany and France may experience large losses in investor confidence as a
result of their inability to respect existing economic systems of weaker countries without
enforcing their own (“What Would Happen if Greece Quits the Euro?”, 2015), though some
economists argue that the effects would be more political than financial (D. Mchugh, Feb. 2015).
Of course there is no way to know for certain the repercussions of a “grexit.” The added
possibility of Greece leaving not only the European Monetary Union, but the European Union
increases the confusion. Although the ECB declared in 2009 that maintaining a position in the
EU after leaving the EMU would be “legally impossible,” if the EU wanted Greece’s
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membership enough there would be measures taken to do so (“What Would Happen if Greece
Quits the Euro?”, 2015). The European Commission and the Eurogroup, an informal body of
European leaders, have also assured their ability to handle the “fallout of a Grexit” (Saeedy,
2015):
“The stability of the euro area is not in question,” said Valdis Dombrovskis,
Commissioner for the Euro, on Monday. “We have everything we need to manage the
situation. We have a banking union to ensure the stability of the financial sector. We have
[the European Stability Mechanism] to help the most vulnerable economies. The ECB is
using its tools to ensure stability.”
Regardless of whether Greece maintains it membership in the monetary union or not, the
lessons learned by the sovereign debt crisis can be applied to future incidents inside the EMU as
well as to other monetary unions. Although much of the blame has been placed on Greece for the
crisis, there were others to blame such as the creditors and the ratings agencies. Each party will
also feel the repercussions of this crisis in either scenario (whether Greece stays or goes). One
recommendation for the Eurozone members is to focus more on a founding core principal of the
monetary union: Unity (both political and fiscal). In the midst of all of the fiscal and cultural
differences, the reason behind the EMU is often forgotten. As one of the trade centers of the
world, European countries are at an advantage and could very well rival the dollar as a primary
reserve currency in the future if the members work harder at coordination efforts. Every country
felt the crisis, but also had to “pick up the bill” for Greece. The key here is that because each
entity is a part of a monetary union, they now make up a body of interdependent economies and
should treat economic policy and political relations as such. Even though Όλα καλά is not likely
to be heard any time soon, if the European Monetary Union uses these past few years to guide
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future decisions and member countries work harder to structurally change (i.e. Greece working
to address its corruption issues), maybe someday it will be.
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